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On the Moral Significance of sacrifice 
By J Raz 
 
The paper offers a few reflections on moral implications of making sacrifices and of possible 
duties to make sacrifices. It does not provide an exhaustive or a systematic account of the 
subject. There are too many disparate questions, and too many distant perspectives from 
which to examine them to allow for a systematic let alone an exhaustive account, and too 
many factual issues that I am not aware of. Needless to say, the observations that follow are 
in part stimulated by the popularity of some views that are mistaken. I will not however 
examine any specific view or account of these matters. The aim is to provide some pointers 
that will be helpful when considering specific issues regarding the moral significance of 
sacrifice. 
1. 
I take ‘making a sacrifice’ to mean knowingly giving up something, of such value to the agent 
that foregoing it would be deprivation or a hardship, for the sake of something or someone 
that one values, other than oneself or one's interests. In the long run, a sacrifice could turn 
out to enhance one's interests etc., but if it was done in order to enhance one’s interests, it 
would not be a sacrifice[so long as was not done in order to do so]. Benefits from a 
sacrifice can of course happen accidentally or unforeseeably. But they can be foreseeable. I 
may make a sacrifice in order to save my child’s life, and his life’s eventual richness and 
happiness may greatly enrich my life. So long as in no way did I do it in order to avoid a 
disaster for my life it was a sacrifice. Needless to say, as with anything that depends on the 
agent’s intention, there will be many cases regarding which it will be hard or impossible to 
determine whether they involve a sacrifice or not. What is clear is that a gift or any self-
deprivation undertaken in order to be given an honour or a benefit is not a sacrifice even if 
the benefit does not come – it was just a bad deal. 
My interest is in the moral significance of making a great sacrifice. Needless to say, sacrifices 
may take many different shapes and forms, and also be of different degrees. So I will use ‘a 
great sacrifice’ stipulatively to include ones that seriously and permanently impair one’s 
health or render one seriously disabled, and those that prevent one from carrying on with 
the life one has. By ‘the life one has’ I mean the sort of life one is embarked on, where that 
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sort is identified by the features that are of central importance to the person whose life it is: 
so, if both Abe and Bob are hospital nurses, it could be that being a nurse is (part of) the life 
of one of them and not of the other, if one of them cherishes being a nurse whereas the 
other does not care about it in any way other than as a source of income. I will not discuss 
the sacrifice or the giving up of one’s life, even though it is commonly thought to be the 
supreme sacrifice. I believe with Epicurus that death is nothing to us, that is, nothing to the 
person who is dying, or at least that that is generally the case. Therefore, generally giving up 
one’s life is a sacrifice only when it is a hardship or deprivation for people or causes dear to 
the person who is giving up his life. Given that this is not the occasion to consider this view 
about the value of staying alive1, I will avoid discussing this kind of sacrifice. 
Sacrifices can be or fail to be virtuous, obligatory, something one has reason to do, and 
much else. To simplify matters I will often refer to them as being or not being moral 
requirements. I use the term to fudge the question of the precise moral status involved. 
Saying something like: if a great sacrifice is morally required it has one of the possible moral 
statuses[?] namely it is virtuous, obligatory, supererogatory, etc., and it does not matter for 
current purposes which status it has. 
From the point of view of individuals involved there is a big difference between actions that 
risk ending up with a large sacrifice for the agent, e.g. loss of limb or being kidnapped, and 
actions that essentially involve making a sacrifice, such as resigning an irreplaceable job, or 
where the sacrifice is a virtually certain side effect of the action intended. Where there is a 
known significant risk of a sacrifice which does not materialise no sacrifice occurred, though 
the agent was ready and willing to make a sacrifice. Where there was a known risk and the 
risk materialised, so that the agent suffered a significant loss and hardship we do correctly 
say that the agent made a big sacrifice. In spite of the considerable difference between the 
different cases much of the time I will lump them together. This is not to deny the 
importance of the felt differences for agents, and the consequential policy differences when 
designing or controlling circumstances that call for sacrifices. Yes, it is preferable to ask 
people to run the risk of a sacrifice than to make a sacrifice outright, etc. But much of the 
time the differences would not matter to the discussion of the paper. 
2. 
                                             
1  I argued for it in Chapter 3 of Value, Respect and Attachments.  
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Generally speaking, making a sacrifice is not in itself morally significant. Of course, we 
sometime refer to sacrifices made as an indication of how much one values the cause or 
person. But this is just an instance of the general way of assessing how much one cares or 
values something by how much one is willing to do to secure it or to avoid losing it etc. As 
one among several indicators it serves well, but there is nothing special in mentioning a 
sacrifice in that way. 
Is it wrong to make some sacrifices? Yes, but that is not specific to sacrifices either. It is 
wrong to make silly sacrifices or badly judged ones, or those that are irresponsible towards 
oneself or another (one's child). 
Is the making of a justified, well-judged sacrifice saintly? Not necessarily; not even if it was 
one's duty to make the sacrifice, and not even if one made it for the right reasons, say 
abandoning one’s career and moving to another town to look after an aged parent, when 
there is no satisfactory alternative. One may resent having to make the sacrifice, hate the 
parent whose need made it necessary, hate oneself for not being able to do better, etc. And 
in such cases there is nothing saintly about the sacrifice.2  
The manner in which one makes the sacrifice and the web of beliefs and attitudes 
surrounding it determine what it implies regarding one’s moral dispositions and one’s moral 
character. But that is so for any of one’s actions and omissions. Again, there is nothing 
special about sacrifice here. But is not the making of a sacrifice necessary for the action to 
be anything like saintly? This question requires a broad ranging examination of the degree to 
which and the ways in which acts, activities and omissions reflect on or manifest established 
dispositions and character traits. It cannot be undertaken here. I for one do not think that 
even extreme moral virtue can only be manifested by making a sacrifice. But I will not argue 
for that view here. 
3. 
Is one ever morally required to make a sacrifice, or to make a serious sacrifice, say to 
sacrifice the life one has?  
Clearly, common opinion allows that sacrificing the life one has can be one’s moral duty. 
After all, common opinion has it that people have a moral duty to volunteer for military 
service under certain circumstances, even though doing so regularly forces people to 
                                             
2  I am not referring to cases in which one overcomes negative attitudes of this kind, but rather to occasions in which one succumbs to 
them in thought and feelings. 
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abandon the life they have, without a secure prospect of being able to resume them later 
on.  
I mentioned that the very act of joining the armed forces is often a major sacrifice. Needless 
to say, in the course of serving in the armed forces one may be required to sacrifice health, 
limbs, or life. The same is true of people who join the armed services without conscription, 
or extend their membership after conscription, as well as of police officers, fire brigade 
officers, and some others.  
These are instructive illustrations for several reasons. First, analogical reasoning relying on 
some such cases makes a plausible case for there being a moral duty to make serious 
sacrifices in some cases. In many of these cases, the moral duty follows the imposition of a 
legal duty. That is, there are circumstances where there is no moral duty to join the armed 
forces except that once there is such a legal duty, that becomes also a moral duty. In other 
cases, there is a moral duty to do something, even if it involves making serious sacrifice, a 
duty that is independent of any legal or other institutional duty. But let us consider first the 
cases where a legal or institutional duty comes first. 
First, to clarify the obvious: It is not my contention that whatever the law requires becomes, 
as a result, a moral duty; only that sometimes this is the case. Second, there is no denying 
that sometimes when the law’s requirements involve making serious sacrifices, that very fact 
engenders resentment and grudging obedience, as well as a tendency to evade or simply 
break the law. But often enough it does not. Rather, most people join in the belief that the 
requirement is justified, being a civic duty or something of the kind. They know that life 
involves duties to others, and duties to the community, and that they personally bear their 
share of the burden of such duties. I do not mention these facts to suggest that these 
attitudes are self-verifying, that people have these duties because they believe that they have 
them. My sole point is that these facts remind us that the thought that morality cannot 
require serious sacrifices because making them is more than can be expected of ordinary 
human beings, that making them without resentment, or making them at all, can be 
expected only of saintly people, is simply empirically false. 
It seems not too difficult to understand how the making of sacrifices can become part of the 
fabric of life. Here is part of the story: In principle we all know or can know when sacrifices 
will be expected of us. We know that if a fire breaks out in the next door building we may 
have to run into a burning building to try to save trapped people. But we don’t know if and 
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when such a fire will break out. One difference with conscription, when it is part of the 
regular law so that all people who meet certain conditions are liable to a predefined period 
of conscription when they reach a certain age, is that people know or can know of the 
sacrifice expected of them years ahead of time. A second difference is that while the 
folklore of heroism and sacrifice typically concerns individuals acting singly or in small 
groups (though not always: remember the Battle of Thermopylae) conscription and other 
legally required sacrifices affect large segments of the population, selected or determined in 
a fair way (at east they could be so determined. A third important difference is that the legal 
requirements are, as we say, backed by sanctions, formal and informal. 
The sanctions make it easier for people to make the required sacrifices, and this for at least 
two reasons. First, they can see or come to believe that they have no choice, the sanctions, 
formal such as fines or community service or imprisonment, and the informal ones, loss of 
reputation, adverse social reactions, loss of face, not to say loss of one’s job, etc. ., mean 
that in many of these cases one has, or feels one has no choice but to make the required 
sacrifice. Besides, the fact that the requirement is enforced, as we say, by law, assures 
people that they are not taken advantage of by shirkers who benefit from their sacrifices, 
while not sacrificing anything themselves. The law, when functioning properly, solves the 
assurance problem, making it psychologically easier for people to carry the burdens allotted 
to them. 
The fact that conscription and other legally enforced sacrifices apply to large sections of the 
population also makes sacrifice easier, as it is easier to act as part of a similarly oriented 
body of people. One derives strength and support from sharing the conditions one is in with 
others. The advantages of the first difference are also obvious. Knowing in advance of the 
sacrifice and its general character makes it possible to take it into account when thinking 
about and planning one’s future. It may even enable one to change its character as a 
sacrifice. For example, one may decide on a military career. As a result the period during 
which one is conscripted is no longer a sacrifice of the life one has. It becomes the life one 
has. Many people find less dramatic solutions: while their time in the armed services is a 
disruption of their normal life as it was and as it will be, they try to use the time in the 
military to acquire some skills that interest them for their own sake, or for future use, etc. 
Even when no such avenue to lessen the sacrifice are available, it is easier to bear when its 
place in one’s life is predictable. 
4. 
 6 
Could it be that one may be morally required to make big sacrifices only if there is a legal or 
other institutional requirement to that effect? One reason to doubt this possibility is that so 
far as the three differences listed above are concerned, the differences they mark are a 
matter of degree. Almost universally people’s moral views are shared among large groups. 
So that whether or not they are institutionally enshrined they are known and understood by 
whole groups of people, thus having a public definition even when they are not legally 
defined. That definition eases the burden of decisions when is a sacrifice required, and mean 
that people’s conduct in making required sacrifices is socially supported, and failure to make 
them is socially disapproved. Without denying that conditions are different when the moral 
duties are legally enshrined, one has to admit that there are many similarities between the 
social recognition and the legal recognition of moral duties, similarities that make 
compliance with those duties easier for individuals, partly by enabling them to incorporate 
the duties into the parts of their lives that provide meaning and a sense of fulfilment, and 
partly by providing a background of support for compliance and pressure against violations 
of moral requirements.  
That great sacrifice is sometimes morally required leaves open the possibility that it cannot 
be something one has a strict duty to do, or that if there is a strict duty to make a great 
sacrifice, failure to fulfil that duty is excusable, and if not altogether excusable then at least 
any blame attached to the failure is mitigated by the fact that it is a failure to make a great 
sacrifice. Various considerations can tempt people into such views. One of them relies on 
some thoughts about the relations between motivation and sacrifice. But what thoughts?  
One assumption is that there is a reverse correlation between degree of sacrifice and 
degree of motivation: the greater a sacrifice the less willing is one to make it. It can be given 
a form which makes it close to true. For example, it may be taken to say that if one can 
achieve a goal one is set on either by doing A or by doing B, and the agent believes that the 
only difference between them is that A involves a smaller sacrifice on his part than B then 
the agent will choose to realise his goal by doing A rather than by doing B. Most of the time 
agents will have that preference, but not always. Sometimes an agent will pursue his goal by 
doing B because (a) that will enable him to feel more confident that he has done all he could 
have done, or because (b) he would feel that his (greater) sacrifice would expiate his guilt 
for being in a condition where he has to pursue that goal, etc. Sometimes the failure of the 
assumption may be attributable to an irrationality in the agent (as perhaps in case (a) above), 
but that is not always so (a sense of expiation through sacrifice is not necessarily irrational).  
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Once  we develop the assumption to make it true it turns out to be nothing more than (a 
direct derivation from) the truism that there is no case for incurring greater disadvantages 
than would likely suffice to secure one’s goal. It does not tell us anything about the 
connection between sacrifice and motivation. 
What some people have in mind is (among other variants on this thought) something like 
this: suppose that people who are C have a duty to achieve goal G. Doing so may require 
different things of those people. Some of them could achieve the goal only if they make a 
great sacrifice. But normally people cannot be expected to make great sacrifices. Human 
nature is such that one can rarely and/or with great difficulty be motivated to make a great 
sacrifice. Therefore, either that moral duty does not apply to them, or they are excused if 
they do not fulfil it, etc. However, many of the earlier reflections aimed to show that that 
assumption, that view of the connection between great sacrifice and motivation is mistaken. 
Hence the questions about the scope of moral duties, and the grounds for excuses are not 
affected by such views about sacrifice.  
We need to understand when is the making of great sacrifices particularly difficult to 
motivate. It is likely that what makes great sacrifices difficult also makes compliance with 
moral duties in other cases difficult. Not surprisingly, it turns out that many factors affect 
the motivation to comply with moral requirements. We gain some understanding of their 
nature by examining the conditions, like those surveyed above, which help with complying 
with demanding moral duties: the ability to predict when one may encounter them, and to 
find ways of integrating them into one’s life; the support one gains from the common 
opinion of one’s community, and of course of one’s friends, etc. The absence of such factors 
creates the emotional, and therefore the motivational difficulty of facing up to one’s 
obligations. These, however, are the conditions of a wholesome life in general: if one is at 
peace with oneself one can find that complying with moral requirements enables one to 
affirm one’s sense of self-respect and self-worth. Being consumed with self-doubt, self-
loathing, or guilt makes one more conflicted, more inclined to self-destructive behaviour 
including immoral conduct (or what one takes to be immoral). Being at odds with the 
society one lives in breeds alienation, and negative-destructive attitudes, and drives one to 
extremes of defiance or of capitulation to demands that are not understood, and 
compliance with which increases the negative attitudes rather than infusing one with a sense 
that one’s life has a meaning. One can go on and detail the conditions that best sustain 
moral life – “best sustain” because there is no suggestion here that one cannot lead a 
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morally exemplary life without them – however, there is no point in adding details. The 
general picture is fairly clear. The moral life is best sustained when moral requirements and 
people’s attitudes towards them are integrated in what I will call a broadly understood 
support network of psychological and social factors encompassing all other aspects of life. It 
is a mistake to try to understand moral attitudes and moral life as an autonomous sphere, 
detached from all the rest. 
One has to be lucky to find oneself at home in oneself and to be in a society that is moral 
and to which one feels an unconflicted sense of belonging. Saying that is no more than saying 
that the moral life is a social life, and that one is not assured of living in conditions that 
support both wholesomeness and morality. Of course, even the best support networks 
leave one struggling with oneself on occasion. There are no conditions, however perfect, in 
which one can avoid solitary struggle with one’s conscience and emotions. these struggles 
may be occasioned when facing the demand to make a sacrifice, but they are as or more 
likely to occur when confronting misfortunes that, as it were, inflict sacrifices (losses that 
would have been sacrifices had they been the results of one’s intentional action), or other 
circumstances that cast the success and direction of one’s life in doubt.  
 
 
